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AUTHORS' MORAL RIGHTS - REFORM

PROPOSALS IN CANADA: CHARTER OR
BARTER OF RIGHTS FOR CREATORS?*
By

DAVID VAVER**

I. INTRODUCTION
Case 1: The movie studio that commissioned the film
"Brazil" preferred a happier ending than the one created by the
producer. It refused to release the film unless the ending was
changed. The producer, Terry Gilliam, ex-"Monty Python" and no
stranger to moral rights litigation,1 refused to make the change; his
contract required alterations to be approved by him. Gilliam is
quoted as saying: "It became a fight over who's the boss, whether
...
the studio would be in control or whether it would be me as the
artist."2 The studio grudgingly changed its mind and released the

Copyright, 1987, David Vaver.
**Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. An earlier version of this article was
initially presented at a meeting in Montrdal of L'Association Littdraire et Artistique
Internationale (ALAI),Section Canada, at l'Universit du Qu6bec A Montrdal on February
26, 1986, and later at a faculty seminar on September 24, 1986, at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I am grateful to participants at both sessions for their valuable comments, many of which have
been incorporated into the final manuscript. I am particularly grateful to my colleague
Professor Reuben Hasson for his helpful suggestions on an earlier draft, and to the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing me with leave time in
1985 to study A Charter of Rights for Creators.
1 Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies Inc. (1976), 538 F.2d 1.
2 R. Base, "All's Well that Ends Well for Brazil" Toronto Star (26 January 1986) F1 at

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[yoL_ 25 NO. 4

film after the Los Angeles Film Critics' Association voted "Brazil"
the best movie for 1985.
Case 2: Motion picture directors told a meeting of the u.s.
National Association of Television Program Executives that television
stations airing movies edited for television should run notices at the
beginning and end of the film and at the beginning of each
commercial break, indicating if the film had been edited and, if so,
whether this had occurred with the director's co-operation. The
directors indicated that their Guild would seek to negotiate the
matter this year. The suggestion "prompted nervous titters from the
3
audience."
Case 3: The world premiere of Sidney Lumet's film "Power"
at the 8th u.s. Film Festival at Park City, Utah, was aborted when,
three-quarters through the filming, the studio executives realized that
the film reels were being shown out of order. The studio president
and the producer were out taking a walk at the time. A visitor at
the screening is reported as saying that "if this had happened at the
Tokyo Film Festival, the projectionist would have committed harikiri by now."4
Case 4: The copyright owner of Carson McCullers' novel
"The Member of the Wedding," published in French in 1949 under
the title "Frankie Adams," complained that Claude Miller's recent
prize-winning film "L'Effront6e" infringes the former's copyright.
Miller is reported as saying: "I have never intended to hide that
[McCullers'] influence ran through my picture. I do not believe,
however, that I have made an adaptation of this beautiful book."
He added that many other influences and references, such as
Colette, Mark Twain, Charles Dickens, Balthus, Andrew Wyeth,

Variety (22 January 1986) 32. The pressure seems already to have borne fruit, A Los
Angeles station airing an uncut version of "One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest" had director
Milos Forman on camera before the start of the film, praising the "very civilized and noble"
example of the station: Globe & Mail (21 February 1986) C3.
4 Ibid at 5, 30.
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Auguste Renoir, Frangois Truffaut, Joshua Logan and Ingmar
Bergman, were also to be found in his film.5
Case 5: The author of the recently released unauthorized
biography, "Barbra Streisand: The Woman, The Myth, The Music"
claims in the book that Streisand did not write her Oscar-winning
song "Evergreen" alone, but with the uncredited help of singersongwriter Rupert Holmes. Streisand and Holmes have both issued
statements denying
that Holmes composed or collaborated on any
6
song.
the
of
part
The above items appeared during the same week in two
newspapers; one a daily, the other a trade paper. Since then, a
fierce, as yet unresolved, debate has arisen about whether colourizing
black-and-white movies for television exhibition violates the interests
7
of directors, and actors, as well as the artistic integrity of the films.
These examples indicate how frequently issues involving authors'
moral rights occur; in particular, the right to have the work correctly
attributed and the right not to have it distorted, and the importance
and sometimes subtlety of the issues concerned to the various parties
involved.
The recent Canadian Parliamentary Subcommittee Report
entitled A Charter of Rights for Creators8 stated that authors need

5bid at 1, 91.
6 R. Harrington, "Streisand Steps Up the Shelling Over Book" Toronto Star (26 January
1986) D1-2.

7 Greenstone, "A Coat of Paint on the Past? Impediments to Distribution of Colorized
Black and White Motion Pictures" (1986) 5 Entertainment & Sports Lawyer 12; L. Bennetts,

"Colorizing Film Classics: A Boon or a Bane?" [New York] Times (5 August 1986) 1, 21.
8 Subcommittee on the Revision of Copyright of the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Communications and Culture (1985, Minister of Supply and Services, Canada)
[hereinafter Charterof Rights for Creators].
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to have their droit moral recognized and enhanced: "moral rights
should have as much importance as economic rights."9
I propose to assess this statement in the light of the current
state of the law, including section 12(7) of the CopyrightAct, 10 and
in the light of the Report recommendations dealing with moral
rights. On 27 May 1987, Bill C-60, incorporating the first round of
proposed amendments to the CopyrightAct and including provisions
on moral rights, was given its first reading in the Canadian House
of Commons. At press time, the Bill had passed third reading with
amendments and was before the Senate. Since the Bill hews to
much of the Report's policy, I shall also comment on the Bill's
proposals.
II. MORAL RIGHTS THEORY
A. TraditionalMoral Rights Theory
The intimate bond between an author" and his or her work
has been the central idea underlying the development of the theory
of moral rights in Europe since the end of the eighteenth century.
The work is treated as an expression of the author's intellect and as
an aspect of his or her personality. Any assault on the work by
another is as much a trespass on the author's rights as is a trespass
to his or her body or tangible property. Thus, an author should

9 -bid at 6.

10 R.S.C. 1970, c. (-30. The provision reads: "Independently of the author's copyright,
and even after the assignment, either wholly or partially, of the said copyright, the author has

the right to claim authorship of the work, as well as the right to restrain any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of the work that would be prejudicial to his honour or
reputation"
11 "Author" is used here throughout, as in the CopyrightAct, to encompass all creative
people, including artists, composers and dramatists.
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have the right to have the work correctly12 credited to him or her and
to have it protected against distortions.
This theory of moral rights is attractive for a number of
reasons. First, it serves to organize moral rights as a form of
personal, rather than proprietary, right - a necessity for legal systems
accustomed to classifying and distinguishing property from
personality. Second, it explains why an assignment of copyright in
a work does not carry with it the author's moral rights, any more
than an assignment transfers any other personal right, such as the
author's ability to sue for defamation. Third, it emphasizes the
continuing importance of the initial creator of the work - something
that tends to be forgotten as the work is later commercially exploited
by other persons more intent on protecting their own interests than
those of others earlier in the creative process. Fourth, it recognizes
the psychological injury an author suffers when his or her work fails
to be credited correctly or at all, or when it is modified in a way
that fails to accord with his or her original artistic intent. Authors
are often proud of their work and want some societal recognition of
it. Fifth, the theory underscores the importance of literature and
the arts as part of a society's culture, and the public's interest in not
having aspects of its culture falsified. The public interest is
particularly emphasized in those jurisdictions which, while entrusting
the author and his or her heirs with the power to vindicate moral
rights during the term of copyright, vest the later exercise of those
powers in a governmental agency.
B. Moral Rights Theory Reformulated from a Social and Economic
Perspective
An explanation of moral rights theory based on the notion
of the work as an outgrowth of the author's personality may be
satisfying metaphysically or juristically. It is, however, incomplete
because it ignores the social and economic context in which these
rights have come to be asserted.

12 Fitzpatrick C-J.C. accepted this theory in his judgment in Morang& Co. v. Le Sueur
(1911), 45 S.C.R. 95 at 97-8.
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The moral rights movement started gaining its impetus in the
nineteenth century at a time when authors were becoming
independent professionals free of the yoke of royal, ecclesiastical,
and seigneurial patronage. Their ability to earn a living depended
upon obtaining a reputation within their potential market. This
reputation could accrue only if their name was associated with their
works; the more an author's works became popular and his or her
reputation was enhanced, the more marketable became his or her
13
future works and the more income the author was able to earn.
It may be distasteful to equate artistic endeavour with trade
in goods or services, but the analogy is nonetheless appropriate for
the many authors who rely on their creative talents for their
livelihood. By the turn of this century, both the common law 4 and
the civil law15 recognized that traders were entitled to protect their
goodwill against misrepresentation: no-one could adopt for his or
her business or wares a name or mark deceptively similar to that of
an existing trader, or palm off any goods, especially inferior ones, as
the goods of the first trader. The same underlying purposes that
passing off actions, however imperfectly, promoted and reinforced
were present when authors sought to exercise their moral rights.
Just like entrepreneurs, authors sought to create and strengthen
their customer base, to prevent rivals reaping where they had not
sown, and to ensure that their product and information about it in
the marketplace were authentic so that consumers got what they
thought they were paying for and what the producer intended them
to get.

13 Stephen Ladas recognized this point:

"When the integrity of the work or its

paternity is safeguarded, its commercial value to the author is also secured. The term 'moral
right' cannot mean that this right is without economic importance and without influence on
the material exploitation of the work." The InternationalProtection of Literary and Artistic
Property (New York. The Macmillan Company, 1938) vol. 1 at 576. Accord: Raestad, La
Convention de Berne revis'e a Rome 1928 (Paris, 1931) at 77.
14

A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. A.W. Gamage Ltd (1915), 32 R.P.C. 273 (H.L.).

15

Dawid, ed., Pinner'sWorld Unfair Competition Law (1978, Sijthoff & Noordhoft), vol.

4, title "Unfair Competition," passimn.
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C. A Digression: Pseudonymous and Anonymous Works
This reformulated theory is compatible with the author's right
to produce works anonymously or pseudonymously.
The
fundamental principle of the law of passing off is that the market be
told the truth about the connection between a product and its
producer. An anonymous work tells no lie: the public is simply told
that the author does not wish his or her identity revealed. An
author who later wishes to announce his or her identity is free to do
so. 1 6 Pseudonymous works do tell a little lie: the author's true
identity is not revealed. Yet the practice protects an author's
privacy and autonomy, and is an age-old and harmless device wellknown to the public. It is also consistent with the law of passing
off: a trade mark rarely reveals the identity of its owner, but this
does not affect the mark owner's right to sue for passing off or
trade mark infringement.17
An author's adoption of another author's pseudonym,
however, constitutes a more serious deception. The law of passing
off discourages this practice by recognizing that the goodwill in the
pseudonym is vested in the first author, who may enjoin others,
including his or her employer, from appropriating it.18 Similarly,
illiterate celebrities who pretend to write their memoirs but employ
a ghost-writer to do so should also recognize the latter's right to be
credited in some such form as "by [celebrity's name] with [ghostwriter's name]." Failure to give appropriate credit tells the public
the lie that literacy is one of the celebrity's attributes, and denies the
16 In France, the author may resile from an agreement for anonymity or concealed
collaboration should he or she later want his or her identity revealed: Da Silva, "Droit Moral
and the Amoral Copyright" (1980) 28 Bull. Copr. Soc. 1 at 29. Old U.S. case law suggesting

a publisher can reveal the author's name against the latter's wishes is incompatible with the
droit moral: cf Ellis v. Hurst (1910), 128 N.Y.S. 144 aff'd without opinion 130 N.Y.S. 1110

(A.D.) with the more sensitive earlier opinion, ibid. (1910), 121 N.Y.S. 438 (S.C.).
17 Blanco White & Jacob eds, Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, (11th ed.

1983) para. 16-32.
18 See, for example, Sykes v. John Fairfax& Sons Ltd, [1978] F.S.R. 312 (N.S.W.); Hines

v. Winnick, [1947] Ch. 708.

For some problems involving group names, see Cooper,

"Ownership and Protection of Performers' Names", in Meyer & Viera eds, 1984 Entertainment
Publishing and the Arts Handbook (New York: Clark Boardman, 1984) at 149 ff.
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ghost-writer the benefit of whatever fame is his or her due.19 Any
agreement denying or neglecting to give appropriate credit should
accordingly be unenforceable on public policy grounds because it
deceives the public.2 °

D. Reformulated Theory Applied by Canadian Courts
It is fundamental to a proper appreciation of the role and
importance of moral rights doctrine to understand that it is in many
cases concerned with the ability of an author to earn his or her
livelihood and to obtain the reward for his or her works that the
marketplace considers appropriate for those works. It is designed to
reinforce the autonomy and individuality of the author. The public's
reaction to a particular work will affect the value of the author's
present and future works. 21 Decisions or proposals that weaken this
19 The originator of an idea who uses someone else to put the idea into copyright form
may also deserve appropriate credit. Thus, where the plot of a children's book was more
important than the literary effort needed to put it into prose, a court thought the appropriate
credit line was "by [story creator] with [ghost-writer]": Courtenay v. Polkosnik (1983), 77
C.P.R.(2d) 140 at 144 (Ont. H.C.). The court rejected the argument that the ghost-writer
should receive no credit whatsoever. Similarly, in Mitchell v. Brown (1880), 6 V.L.R.(E.) 168
at 171, the court thought that a picture of the anatomy of a horse, produced by an artist from
elaborate information supplied by a veterinary surgeon, should have dual credit: "I should be
glad if some way could be found by which the plaintiff could get all the credit of its
production as a veterinary work of art, and the defendant all the credit of it as a matter of
pictorial art." The difficult question remains: what form should the credit take?
20

ParamountProductionsv. Smith (1936), 91 F.2d 863 at 867-68 (CA) (dissent). Cf

Report of the Committeeto consider the Law on Copyrightand Designs ("Whitford Committee'),
Cmnd. 6732 (1977), para. 56: moral rights should be waivable in "the case of a ghost writer
who, for a fee, will write the memoirs of some celebrity"; see infra, note 85.
21 The point has been clearly recognized in English and Australian cases enforcing
moral rights through the medium of contract law. see, for example, Tolnay v. Criterion Film
Productions Ltd (1936), [1936] 2 All E.R. 1625 at 1626-27 (K.B.D.), Goddard J.; Associated
Newspapers Ltd v. Bancks (1951), 83 C.L.R. 322 at 338 (Aust. H.C.).
That the value of a work depends upon the identity of its maker, as well as his or her
standing according to contemporary taste, is also well recognized judicially. Leaf v.
InternationalGalleries,[1950] 2 KB. 86 at 92 (C.A.) (dealer's innocent statement to buyer that
painting was by Constable "was a representation of great importance, which went to the root
of the contract and induced [the plaintiff] to buy; Smith v. Zimbalist (1934), 38 P.2d 170
(Cal.Ct.App.) (sale of innocently misrepresented Guarnerius and Stradivarius violins held void
for mistake); cf Shapiro v. Banque CanadienneNationale (1981), [1981] 4 W.W. R. 560, 123
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link between the author and his or her prospective audience are not
merely a metaphorical assault on the author's personality:

they

undermine the author's independence, and depreciate the market
value of the work and, ultimately, the author's income.

Canadian case law has recognized and given effect to the
author's economic necessity to have his or her work credited and
to have its integrity respected. A Qu6bec court labelled as "fraudes
intol6rables" the acts of a film-maker who took another's play,
changed its title, and failed to credit the playwright. It went on to
say: "un auteur a droit au cr6dit de son travail, au respect de ses
textes, et aussi au bjnjfice materiel quipeut lui r6sulter du prestige de
22
son nor ou de la vogue de ses oeuvres."
Similarly, in assessing damages for infringement of an
architect's copyright in building plans, a British Columbian judge
took into account the plaintiffs loss "of the opportunity to enhance
his reputation:"
His plans have been used and yet he has had no credit for that. To be given credit
in a timely and appropriate way is a matter of obvious importance, particularly to
a young designer seeking to make his reputation. Had he given a licence, it would
likely have been a term of that that he be allowed to have a sign on the project.
Having in mind that the buildings are on a very prominent
intersection, that would
23
have been an advantage of considerable potential value.

The court in Goulet v. Marchand24 makes a similar point when
assessing damages in respect of a co-author's complaint that he was
not named as such on a published law text. Speaking of the effects
of publication of a worthy book, Gagnon J. noted: "il appert plut6t

D.L.R.(3d) 630 (Man. Q.B.), aff'd (1982), [1983] 5 W.W.R. 768, 143 D.L.R. (3d) 574 (Man.
C.A.) (buyer assumed risk at sheriff's sale that painting was by Suzor-Cote).
22 Joubert v. Ggracino (1916), 26 Que. K.B. 97 at 110-11 (emphasis added). The case
was principally concerned with the predecessor of s. 26(2) of the Act, making such acts
criminal offences.
23Kaffka v. Mountain Side Developments Ltd (1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 157 at 163

(B.C.S.C.), Esson J.
24 (18 September 1985) (Que. 200-05-002826-837) (Que. S.C.), Gagnon J [hereinafter
Goulet]. The decision was approved, but distinguished on the facts, in Dion v. Trottier (1986),
9 C.I.P.R. 258 at 262 (Que. S.C.).
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que beaucoup de prestige et de chances d'avancement sont attach6s
A une telle publication pour des professeurs particuli~rement."25
Prestige and prospects for career advancement have obvious
economic implications: they raise the author's market value both in
his or her career and in any future work that he or she publishes.
In Goulet, failure to credit the co-author cost him the opportunity
to increase his marketability. The damages award accordingly
reflected this loss.
A similar rationale can be discerned in Snow v. The Eaton
Centre Ltd,26 a case dealing with the right of integrity under section
12(7) of the CopyrightAct. In this case an artist was able to compel
the shopping mall owners of his sculpture to remove modifications
they had made to it. The Ontario High Court upheld the artist's
judgment that the modifications were "prejudicial to his honour or
reputation" in terms of section 12(7) because his judgment was
"reasonably arrived at."27 I have argued elsewhere that the Snow
decision affirms an artist's right to pursue his or her livelihood
without officious intermeddling, however well-meaning, by others,
and consequently the right to ensure that the art market fairly
assesses his or her present and future works
on their intrinsic merit,
28
influences.
extraneous
undesired
free of

25 Ibid at 22 of the unreported judgment.

26 (1982), 70 C.P.R.(2d) 105 (Ont.H.C.). Section 12(7) is set out at supra, note 10.
27 Similarly, in deciding that a studio's deletion of four words from a television film
writer's script constituted an impermissible "structural alteration" under the writer's contract
with the studio, an English court held that the writer "prima facie, would appear to be the

best judge" of the question and granted an interlocutory injunction preventing the altered film
being aired: Frisby v. British BroadcastingCorporation (1967), [19671 2 All E.R. 106 at 117
(Ch.).
26 D. Vaver, "Snow v. The Eaton Centre: Wreaths on Sculpture Prove Accolade for
Artists' Moral Rights" (1983) 8 Can. Bus. LJ. 81 at 93-94.
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'!A Charter of Rights for Creators": Is it rather "A Barter of

Rights?"
The recommendations on moral rights contained inA Charter
of Rights for Creators29 clarify a number of matters. For example,
moral rights are accorded the same remedies as ordinary copyright
infringements, their term is made coincident with copyright,
corporations are given moral rights, a moral "synchronization" right
will control the context in which one's work appears; no modification
of an original artistic work may be allowed to occur, whether or not
the artist's honour or reputation is impaired, and moral rights are
made freely assignable and waivable. 30
These proposals do not however justify the Report's claims
that it was enhancing moral rights and that these rights should be
just as important as economic rights.3 1 Rather, if the premise
suggested earlier is accepted (that moral rights are integral to the
author's independence and ability to earn a fair reward for his or
her work) the Report is seriously deficient in a number of respects.
A letter dated 7 February 1986, sent jointly by the Minister
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Minister of
Communications, transmitted the Government Response to the
Report to the Subcommittee's Chairman. Page two of the Response
indicated that the governmerit "agree[d] in principle" with the
Report's recommendations on moral rights. Two principal exceptions
were noted. First, the new moral "synchronization" right would not
extend to works for which a blanket licence had been granted to a
collective society of copyright owners; consequently, users would not
be obliged to obtain a second authorization for works that had been

29 Charter of Rights for Creators,supra, note 8 at 6-8.
30 Ib.

at 13.

31 Ibid at 6.
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assigned to such societies to administer. 32 Second, on the issue of
waiver or assignment of rights, including moral rights, "a provision
will be incorporated in the Act to limit the term of licences and
of
33
the assignment of rights so as to protect creators from abuse."
Bill C-60, which was introduced to amend the CopyrightAct,
only partly tracks the policy outlined in the Government Response.
It proposes that section 12(7) of the old Act be replaced with new
provisions that give a plaintiff whose moral rights have been
breached the same remedies as a plaintiff whose copyright has been
infringed (proposed sections 18.1, 20(1.1), and a new section 24),
that moral rights be made coterminous with copyrights (section 21(1)
of the Bill), that moral rights are to include a right to prevent the
work from being associated with products, services, causes, or
institutions to the prejudice of the author's honour or reputation
(proposed section 18.2(1)(b)), and that the latter formula of
prejudice to honour or reputation be dispensed with where moral
rights in artistic works (other than architecture) are involved
(proposed section 18.2(2)).
The Report, the Government Response to it, and now Bill C60 all have some serious deficiencies. These include:
1. There is no right to withdraw a work.
No droit de retrait, or the right to withdraw one's work, is
recommended, or even discussed, in the Report, nor does it find a
place in Bill C-60. The Regroupement des Journalistes du Qu6bec
argued for this right before the Subcommittee, citing cases where
magazines had changed direction between the time articles had been

32 Government of Canada, "Government Response to the Report of the Sub-Committee
on the Revision of Copyright", February 1986, at 2 [hereinafter Government Response]. The
government's agreement in principle with the Report's recommendation that musical works
should have moral rights is also made subject to this qualification: ibid at 7.
33

bid at 2.
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submitted and published3 4 The right of withdrawal is also important
where the author's ideas or style has changed since the work has
been submitted or published, so that continued exposure of the work
becomes a source of embarrassment to him or her.
The droit de retrait is well established in many countries,
including France and Germany. The utility of the right, however,
is somewhat lessened by the requirement that the author reimburse
the publisher for loss flowing from the withdrawal.3 5 Yet the
principle seems worthy of recognition. If an author is sufficiently
embarrassed by the continuation of the work to be prepared to
reimburse the publisher for its losses in order to have the work
withdrawn, what possible opposing interest of the publisher is worth
defending in such a case?
2. Employees may have no moral rights.
The current moral rights provision in section 12(7) of the
Copyright Act may not, on its true interpretation, extend to
employees. Neither the Report nor the Government Response
clarifies the matter. Bill C-60 does not replicate the language of
section 12(7) that gave rise to the difficulty and thus probably does
not exclude employees from being the beneficiaries of moral rights. 6
34

Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence of the Subcommittee of the Standing Committee
on Communications and Culture on The Revision of Copyright, Issue No. 14, at 50 (H.C., 1st
Sess., 33rd Part., 1984-5). Keyes & Brunet, Copyright in Canada:Proposalsfor a Revision of

the Law (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1977) at 57-59 also recommended such a right.
R. Sarraute, "Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists under
French Law" (1968) 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 465 at 477; Strauss, 'The Moral Right of the
Author" (1960), Study #4 prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and

Copyright of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (86th Cong., 1st Sess.) 109 at 122.
36 Cf D. Vaver, "Authors' Moral Rights in Canada" (1983) 14 IIC 329, at 353-54. The
argument is that the opening words of s.12(7) (supra,note 10), "Independently of the author's

copyright, and even after the assignment ...
of the said copyright," predicate a case where the
author was the original owner of copyright. By s.12(3), copyright ownership of employees'

work vests in the employer, not the employee author.
Section 43 of the Copyright Act 1956 (U.K.), creating a tort of false attribution, extends
to employees and ex-employees: Crocker v. Papunya Tula Artists Ply Ltd (1985), 61 A.L.R. 529
(Fed.Ct., Aust.) on equivalent Australian provision (Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.), s. 191). In
France, moral rights theoretically accrue to an employee but in practice are normally assigned
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However, the new section 12.1(2), proposed by the Bill permits
authors freely to waive moral rights. In addition, the right of
paternity, created by section 12.1(1), partly depends for its very
existence on what is "reasonable in the circumstances." As we shall
see, these circumscriptions may, when applied to the case of
employees, be almost as pernicious as excluding employees altogether
from their enjoyment.
The Report also recommended that corporations should
enjoy moral rights3 7 and that the definition of "employee" be

extended to include certain independent freelancers3 8 The former
recommendation has much to commend it. The latter, however, may
take away existing moral rights protection from those who already
have it. The Government Response to the Report did not accept the
Report's view on extending the definition of employees, indicating
that the question would be studied further. Bill C-60 does not
change the current position dealing with copyright in employee
works, nor does it explicitly extend moral rights protection to
corporations. Although it seems likely that corporations will be able
to assert a paternity right in those cases where they are deemed
authors under the Act, corporations may arguably still be incapable
of holding a right of integrity: does a corporation have an "honour
or reputation" that can be prejudiced?
Although the Bill seemingly encompasses employees as
beneficiaries of moral rights, it seems worthwhile to consider why
this should be so as a matter of policy and why the Report was
deficient in not expressly adopting this policy.
If corporations are to have moral rights, equal treatment
demands that employees should also. Why should a co-author's
employee status affect his or her right to be credited?3 9 Why should

by contract to his/her employer Colombet, ProprigtidLitteraire et Artstique, 2d ed. (Paris:
Dalloz, 1980) para. 131.

37 Charter of Rights for Creators, supra, note 8 at 13.
38

INid at 14.

39 Goulet, supra, note 24.
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the plaintiff in Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd40 have failed if he had
produced the sculpture as an employee? Had the Report been
adopted at the time, the plaintiff could have fallen into the
employee category as an "independent freelancer," and Snow's suit
would have failed on this ground. How does such a result square
with the public's interest in the integrity of its culture?
The Report's failure to deal with employees' moral rights,
while making sure that corporations are adequately protected, is all
the more surprising since evidence before the Subcommittee
indicated that many industries customarily credit their employees'
contributions. 41 Surely a Report claiming to be a Charterof Rights
for Creators ought to have encouraged and strengthened these
practices, rather that passing over them in silence. True, there may
be difficulty in accommodating the right of integrity as between an
employee and his or her superior in a corporation, as for example,
42
a newspaper editor's right to edit a journalist's contribution.
Difficulties with particular cases simply mean that more time needs
to be taken to find a satisfactory solution, not that a principle should
be ignored or jettisoned because an exception is troublesome to
formulate.
If, by its silence, the Report meant to affirm that employees
should have no moral rights, this should be firmly opposed. An
employee who is compelled to remain anonymous within an
organization has information about his or her value suppressed, and
the market is consequently unable to judge his or her worth. Other
organizations willing to hire an able author from another
organization may be unable to ascertain his or her identity easily; the
current employer has every incentive to maintain the employee's

40 Supra, note 26.

41 Thus, a witness for the Canadian Daily Newspaper Publishers' Association testified
that "most [newspapers], certainly my own, identify their photographers. I cannot imagine any
paper having any quarrel with adopting that practice" Supra, note 34 at 14:30.
42 Edna Buchanan, a Miami Herald crime reporter, is quoted as saying: "For sanity and
survival, there are three cardinal rules in the newsroom: Never trust an editor, never trust an
editor, and never trust an editor." "Profiles: covering the cops" New Yorker (17 February
1986) 39 at 40.
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anonymity. The result is a systemic undervaluation of the creative
employee's worth.
Interestingly enough, the patent system has long recognized
the importance of an inventor's moral rights. Patents may generally
be granted to the inventor's employer, but the inventor's name must
be stated in the patent application, and must appear in the public
documents once the patent is granted: naming the wrong inventor
or inventors can invalidate the patent.43 Patents registries thus serve
as public data bases, exhibiting the pool of creative talent in
particular fields, and establishing a potential market for this form of
labour.
The importance of publicity as an element in the market
value of labour was judicially recognized as early as the 1920s in
Hepworth Mfg. Co. Ltd v. Ryott. 44 In this case, a contractual clause,
requiring a film star to abandon his screen name upon leaving his
studio's employ, was struck down as an unreasonable restraint of
trade. The court was rightly considerably swayed by evidence
graphically illustrating the value of having one's professional name
known. The actor's original employer was willing to employ him at
his original contract rate of £10 per week. The new employer was
paying him £20. Without his professional name, his salary would
have been £7 per week, until he was able to establish a new identity
and goodwill. Plainly, if an employer is able to control the use of
an employee's name, he or she can pay the employee below-market

See, for example, Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4, s. 28(1); Cornish, Intellectual
Property:Patents, Copyrigh Trade Marks and Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1981)
at 117.
44 [1920] 1 Ch. 1 (C.A.). The tale of Lord Kenyon, too, must strike a responsive chord
in the many young lawyers articling or working in modern law firms. As a young barrister
working for a better-known colleague Dunning, Kenyon is said to have written for a pittance
many hundreds of opinions which Dunning had never read [and which] were copied
from Kenyon's MS. by Dunning's clerk and signed by Dunning's hand... It gradually
oozed out in the profession that Dunning's opinions were written by Kenyon, and the
attorneys thought they might as well go at once to the fountain-head,where they might
have the same supply of pure law at much less cost.
Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England (London: J. Murray, 1874) vol. 3
at 9.
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rates.
The surplus value attached to the asset that the name
represents is thus fully captured by the employer even though the
employee has at least partly contributed to its value. This is
inconsistent with the natural law principle of not "reaping where
thou hast not sown and gathering where thou hast not strawed,"45
which suggests that each person's economic return should be
proportionate to his or her investment in money and labour
expended in creating, maintaining, and enhancing an asset.
In the film industry, screen credit is "of the utmost concern"
to those who live by publicity. 46 Public credit is equally important
to creative people in many other industries. The result of not
extending moral rights theory to employees is thus to perpetuate an
unjust enrichment and indirect restraint of trade favouring current
employers, and to withdraw from the market valuable information
about creative people. This disadvantages creators, prospective new
employers, and ultimately the public, which would benefit from an
employee's talents being employed in their most efficient and highest
valued use.
3. Works may be destroyed.
While recommending that the original of an artistic work not
be modified, the Report says nothing about the work's destruction.
The right of integrity provided in section 12(7) of the current Act

Matthew XXV:24.

This biblical precept may provide both a justification for the

ascription of property rights in an intangible and also the ethical basis of the principle of
unjust enrichment found in both common and civil law; see Cie Immobiire Viger Lt&c v.

Laurdat Gigudre Inc. (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 67 at 76-77; Pettkus v. Becker (1980), [1980] 2
S.C.R. 834 at 852, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 277; White v. Central Trust Co. (1984), 7
D.L.R.(4th) 236 at 245-246 (N.B.C.A.), La Forest J.A. Ca universal principle [of unjust
enrichment] ... affords an excellent opportunity for cross-fertilization between Canada's two
legal systems"); Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38 at 43-46, 29 D.L.R.(4th) 1
at 4-7 (S.C.C.). See George B. Klippert, Unjust Enrichment (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983)
at 37 ff.
46 B.F. Berman & S. Rosenthal, "Screen Credit and the Lav" (1962) 9 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 156 at 185. See also G. Youngman, 'Negotiation of Personal Service Contracts" (1954)
42 Cal. L. Rev. 2 at 4.
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may not include the
right to prevent the owner of an original work
47
it.
destroying
from
The Report should have recommended that the author of
any work has a right not to have the original of the work destroyed,
at least without giving him or her an opportunity to reclaim it at his
or her expense. The public's interest in preserving its cultural items
is best served by such a provision. Exceptions could be made for
works that are routine, such as internal office memoranda that may
need to be shredded periodically, and could easily be drafted upon
evidence being presented about any practical difficulties in
implementing such a proposal. Alternatively, the matter could hinge
on the author's manifested intent or presumed intent, in relation to
certain works, not to have the works preserved indefinitely.
Bill C-60 does not take the matter any further. It does say
in the proposed new section 18.2(3) that good faith steps to restore
or preserve a work and certain other changes (in location or physical
structure) will not in themselves constitute a "distortion, mutilation
or other modification of the work." The retention of the latter
formula, as well as the particular exemptions set out in section
18.2(3), seems to contemplate that destruction is still incapable of
being a breach of moral rights. Thus, nothing explicit has been done
to change the existing case law, that seems to permit complete
destruction, even of an original artistic work.
4. Moral rights are not perpetual.
The Report recommends that moral rights last only as long
as the work's copyright. It thus implicitly rejects the view held in

47

Gnassv. La Cit d'Alma (1977), 09-000032-745 (C.A.); but see contra, E. Colas, "Le

Droit Moral de l'Artiste sur Son Oeuvre" (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 521. If the work is lent
rather than sold, the borrower obviously cannot destroy or mutilate it; indeed, he may be
obliged to take reasonable measures to preserve it, or to notify the lender of its deterioration
so that the latter may take such measures. Breach of these obligations may entitle the lender
to damages: Gnass v. Ville de Montral, [1974] C.S. 414; Roussil v. Ville de Montreal (1982)

Montreal 500-05-003751-771 (S.C.), Bard J.
For a recent French case where a sculptor recovered damages against the destroyers of
an allegedly irreligious work, see Bezombes v. L'Huilier, [1982] Eur. Com. Cas. 7 (C.d'A.,

Paris).
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many countries that such rights should be perpetual.48 Section 21
of Bill C-60 implements the Report's recommendation. Why should
the owners of the original of public domain works have the right to
bowdlerize or mutilate them? The Government Response recognized
this problem: it agreed in principle with the Report's
recommendation that written submissions to Parliament, legislatures
or public bodies of inquiry should be in the public domain, but
indicated that moral rights protection may still be needed for such
material. 49 Regrettably, the Response did not recognize the broader
logic underlying its concern, viz., that public domain works generally
need moral rights protection. A country's culture is not measured
by the life of an author plus fifty years. Passage of time intensifies
the need to preserve the authenticity of work. The right could be
administered by the author's heirs or by some body dedicated to the
continuation of the country's culture, as is currently the practice in
France.
Even if the duration of moral rights were not perpetual but
only coterminous with copyright, a provision entitling some
organization to monitor moral rights of public domain works could
have been proposed, as some countries espousing a limited term for
moral rights have enacted s0 The Report does not propose this, nor
does it suggest that there is any alternative to its views. Bill C-60
is equally silent on this point.

48 For example, France: Loi du 11 mars 1957 sur la proprit litt~raireet artistique,Art.
6(1). Accord: Ladas, op.ciL, supra, note 13 at 602; Michaelidis-Nouaros, "Protection of the

Author's Moral Interests after his Death as a Cultural Postulate" [1979] Copyright 35.
Supra, note 32 at 3.
50 For example, Sweden: see S. Stromholm, "Droit Moral - The International and
Comparative Scene from a Scandinavian Viewpoint" (1983) 14 IIC 1 at 38ff.
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5. Moral rights may be assigned or waived.
The Report recommends that moral rights should be freely
assignable and waivable 51 Any other view would be "paternalism:"
"[c]oncerns expressed that hard-pressed and non-established creators
may be tempted to give away too much control over their works
are well meant, but lead to undesirable constraints."5 2 Just what
these "undesirable constraints" are, is not stated. This proposal is
the most objectionable of the Report's recommendations on moral
rights. It suggests that an apter title for the Report would have
been either A Charter of Rights for Sale or A Barter of Rights for
Creators.
Bill C-60 does not go quite this far. In section 12.1(2), it
states that moral rights may not be assigned but may be waived by
the author. Under subsections (3) and (4), an assignment of
copyright is not in itself a waiver of moral rights. However, waivers
in favour of owners or licensees may be invoked by persons
authorized by the owner or licensee to use the work unless the
contrary is indicated in the waiver.
The principal objections to the Report's proposal and the
provisions of the Bill are:
a) The Report's claim that it was "enhancing" moral rights is
unjustified in the light of its recommendations.
I have argued elsewhere that, as a matter of statutory
construction, people may be unable to contract out of the rights
presently granted under section 12(7) of the Copyright Act, except
where a particular contract is consistent with that provision's policy.
This policy seems to be, first, to redress the frequently unequal
bargaining power and ability of creative persons when dealing with
media entrepreneurs and, second, to protect the public interest in

51 Charter of Rights for Creators,supra, note 8 at 7-8. For the Government Response to
this proposal, see text accompanying notes 80ff., infra.
52

kid at 7.
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the integrity of its culture.53 The case law is consistent with this
view. 54 What the Report does, in fact, is to discard the current
policy bases of section 12(7) and say that there is no public interest
in protecting creative people against improvident bargains or in
preserving the public culture: the public interest is equated with
private interests and may be traded like any other commodity. This
runs directly counter to both federal and provincial policies designed
to maintain and enhance this country's heritage. Bill C-60 does not
depart from the Report's position in this respect.
b) Equating moral rights with economic rights is wrong.
The Report expressly equates moral rights with economic
rights: "all copyright rights - economic as well as moral - should be

assignable or waivable."55
This statement exposes a basic
misunderstanding of the whole doctrine of moral rights, quite apart
from the position under section 12(7). The Report's view was not
held even during the unbridled laissez-faire period prevailing in
Canada and the United States at the turn of the century. In
considering whether an author was entitled under an informal
publishing contract to have a manuscript published under his name
rather than anonymously, a New York judge said in 1910:
Even the matter of fact attitude of the law does not require us to consider the sale

of the rights to a literary production in the same way that we would consider the
sale of a barrel of pork.... The position of an author is somewhat akin to that of
an actor. The fact that he is permitted to have his work published under his name,
or to perform before the public, necessarily affects his5 reputation
and standing, and
6
thus impairs or increases his future earning capacity.

Vaver, supra, note 36 at 349-52; Vaver, supra, note 28 at 94-97.
For example, John Maryon InternationalLtd v. New Brunswick Telephone Co. Ltd
(1982), 141 D.L.R.( 3d) 193 at 246-49 (N.B.C.A.); ADI Ltd v. Destein (1982), 141 D.L.R. (3d)
370 (N.B.Q.B.); Kerr v. The Queen (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 165 at 170 (Fed. T.D.).
Charterof Rights for Creators,supra, note 8 at 7.
56 Clemens v. PressPub. Co. (1910), 122 N.Y.S. 206 at 207-208, Seabury J.(concurring).
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In Canada, Fitzpatrick c-.c. said much the same thing the following
year when deciding that an author was entitled to the return of his
manuscript upon his publisher's refusal to publish it:
I cannot agree that the sale of a manuscript of a book is subject to the same rules
as the sale of any other article of commerce, ag., paper, grain or lumber. The
vendor of such things loses all dominion over them once the contract is executed
and the purchaser may deal with the thing which he has purchased as he chooses.
It is his to keep, to alienate or to destroy. But it will not be contended that the
publisher who bought the manuscript of "The Life of Gladstone," by Morley, or of
Cromwell by the same author, might publish the manuscript, having paid the author
his price, with such emendations or additions as might perchance suit his political
or religious views and give them to the world as those of one of the foremost
publicists of our day. Nor could the author be denied by the publisher the right to
make corrections, in dates or otherwise, if such corrections were found to be
necessary for historical accuracy; nor could the manuscript be published in the name
of another. After the author has parted with his pecuniary interest in the
manuscript,
he retains a species of personal or moral right in the product of his
7
brain.

The right of an inventor to be named when a patent grant issues
cannot be waived or assigned; indeed, even an inadvertent misnomer
is grounds for invalidating a patent 5 8 Why any different view should
be held for the author of a copyright work is unexplained.
Bill C-60 recognizes this point in part by preventing the
assignment of moral rights. Allowing an unfettered power to waive
moral rights, however, seems to rest on the same basic fallacy as that
adopted by the Report.
c) The recommendation may be inconsistent with the Berne
Convention.

The Report's proposal to permit assignments of moral rights
may be contrary to Canada's international obligations under Article
6bis(1) of the 1928 Rome Revision of the Berne International
57

Morang & Co. v. Le Sueur, supra, note 12 at 97. This was well before the enactment
of s. 12(7) by the CopyrightAmendment Act 1931 (Can.).
See too Robinson v. Graves (1935), [1935] 1 K.B. 579 (C.) (contract for commissioned
portrait is contract for skill and labour, not sale of goods); cf. Deta Nominees Pty, Ltd v.
Viscount Plastic ProductsPty. Ltd, [1979] V.R. 167 (S.C.).
58 Falconer, Aldous & Young eds, Terrell on the Law of Patents, 12th ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1971) para. 90; see generally ibid. paras. 76ff.
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Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which
requires moral rights to be protected "m~me apr~s la cession [des
droits patrimoniaux d'auteur]." Article 6bis(2) gives Canada the right
to determine the conditions under which these rights may be
exercised and the remedies available for their protection. This does
not suggest that Canada may change their character by making them
assignable.
Professor Nimmer took a different view of the effect of
Article 6bis. In his opinion Art. 6bis(1) did not "expressly" hold
moral rights to be inalienable. Nimmer claimed that, literally
construed, the provision meant only that a transfer of economic
rights did not in and of itself transfer moral rights.59 Quite apart
from the fact that treaties, like statutes, should generally not be
construed literally but purposively, the materials cited by Nimmer do
not support his broad claim. They do support the proposition that
the exercise of moral rights may be regulated by agreement, but not
that the moral rights may be assigned nor that they may be totally
renounced (functionally as prejudicial to the author as total
assignment).
At the 1928 Rome Conference on the Berne Convention, at
which Article 6bis was first introduced, both the Sub-Committee
recommending the text of the provision as it was finally passed and
the Reporter to the Conference, Piola Caselli, explicitly stated that
the moral rights established by the Article were inalienable. 60 Caselli
M.B. Nimmer, "Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention
and the United States Copyright Law" (1967) 19 Stanford LR. 499 at 524. Recht, Le Droit
d'Auteur en Belgique (Bruxelles: F. Larcier, 1955) at 74 agrees, after having earlier
inconsistently said at 71: "Assurdment, il touche A ce que la personne humaine a de plus
essentiel, A la dignitd, A la gloire, A quelque chose qui n'est pas susceptible de trafic" (my
emphasis).
60 International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Proceedings
of the Conference held at Rome from May 7, to June 2 1928, at 181 (Eng. translation by Pierre
Tisseyre) QFrom now on it is clear that the creator of a literary or artistic work retains on
the product of his thoughts, rights which are above and outside of the conventions of
alienation. These rights which are called 'moral rights' in the absence of a better expression,
are distinct of the patrimonial rights and the cession of the latter do[es] not affect them")
(Sub-Committee Report); at 203 (Art. 6bis(1) "affirms its [sc., the moral right's] specific
character, its essential character which inhaeretpersonae and which therefore is inalienable";
"in the same way as [the paternity right] is not alienable, it cannot be renounced) (Reporters
Report).
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later claimed that the Article was not intended to affect contractual
rights, but nonetheless continued to insist that Article 6bis implicitly
ensured that moral rights, being personal, could not be assigned.
Caselli distinguished between attempts to transfer the right (cessions
or assignments), which were inherently impossible, and contractual
regulationof the right, which was permitted. On the other hand, he
thought that the validity of a clause completely renouncing for the
61
future all moral fights was suspect.
An attempt at the 1948 Brussels Conference on the Revision
of the Berne Convention to make cession explicitly impossible failed.
Some countries, notably Britain, were reluctant to countenance any
significant expansion of the moral rights concept, partly because they
feared that this would make it difficult for the United States
eventually to join the Berne Convention.62 This inaction in 1948
does not change the position under the 1928 and subsequent
versions of the Convention. The nature of moral rights that the
Convention mandates, suggests that assignments are implicitly
prohibited and that, while contracts regulating the exercise of moral
rights for a particular transaction may be valid, states may be
compelled to hold total waivers of such rights void as incompatible
with the policy of Article 6bis.
To the extent that it departs from the Report by forbidding
assignment, Bill C-60 adheres to the literal injunction of Article 6bis.
By allowing unlimited waivers, however, Bill C-60 arguably violates
the spirit of that Article.
d) The recommendations are inconsistent with the personal nature of
moral rights.
By permitting the assignment of moral rights, the Report has
implicitly discarded the long accepted notion that such rights are
personal, not proprietary. On the one hand, this opens up the
61 Caselli, "Correspondance - A propos de l'article 6bis de la Convention de Berne

revis6e" [1940] Le Droit d'Auteur 66 at 68. Others have agreed; for example, van Isacker,
"Letter from Belgium" [1967] Copyright 135 at 138.
62 Documents de la Conf6rence Redunie a Bruxelles du 5 au 26 juin 1948 (Berne, 1951)

at 184-97.
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possibility of an author assigning his or her copyright to one person
and his or her moral rights to another; indeed, there seems to be no
reason why the moral rights cannot be subdivided into their
components, territorially or temporally, and assigned with or without
accompanying economic rights to any number of people. What
policy this furthers is unexplained. 63 On the other hand, since the
Report has not explicitly changed the character of moral rights, they
may still continue to be classified as personal at common law.
Whole or partial assignments might then be held void at common
law: the sale of personal torts is void under the principles of
champerty and maintenance. 64 Moreover, assignments by which the
assignees of paternity rights are entitled to attribute authorship to
someone other than the true author would seem to be void as
contracts tending to the promotion of public deception. A trap for
the unwary may well have been created.
Even if it is assumed that such assignments are permissible
at common law, the Report does not explain their intended effect.
Will the assignment create in the assignee new moral rights
measured by his or her interests, rather than those of the assignor?
Or will the assignee merely be able to assert the assignor's rights
vicariously? In the latter case, where the assignor's and assignee's
interests diverge, the assignee will have no incentive to assert the
assignor's interests. Perhaps, problems such as these caused the
common law to prohibit assignments of personal torts: how does the
assignee of another's right of action for defamation practically assert
63 A limited concept of assignment may be needed to permit moral rights to be
transferred from one corporation to another on a merger or reorganization (see Briefsumbitted
to the Standing Committee, supra, note 8 by the Joint Copyright Legislation Committee of the

Patent & Trademark Institute of Canada and the Canadian Bar Association (1985) at 72), or
to allow descent to the author's heirs or other testamentary beneficiaries (Keyes & Brunet,
supra, note 34 at 59). These special situations however do not make the case for moral rights
to be generally assignable.
64 Beloff v. PressdramLtd, [1973] 1 All E.R. 241 at 254 (Ch.). See too Union Carbide
Can. Ltd v. Trans-CanadianFeeds Ltd (1965), 32 Fox P.C. 17 at 33-34 (Exeh.): cause of action

for past patent infringements cannot be assigned at common law even with patent, though
position under civil law may be different.

Significantly, the U.K. Green Paper on Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs
and Performers' Protection (reprinted at (1981) 28 Bull.Cop. Soc. 570 at 628) states that
moral rights should not be assignable.
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the right? No doubt similar concerns motivated civilian legal systems
to treat moral rights as uncedable. Fortunately, Bill C-60 corrects
this gap in the Report's understanding and expressly forbids
assignment or cession of moral rights.
e) Making moral rights fieely assignable and waivable will in practice
eliminate them entirely.
The Report's stand in favour of "freedom of contract" and
against "paternalism" is totally misplaced and is the most mischievous
of its recommendations. It sounds the death-knell for virtually all
moral rights in Canada. This naive support of freedom of contract
fails to recognize that perhaps as many as 90 percent of all contracts
today are standard form contrats d'adhsion.65
Except in the
relatively few instances where creative people have formed
associations that have then bargained from a position of equality
with the corporate consumers of their product, creative people have
had little input into these contracts. There was certainly plenty of
evidence before the Subcommittee indicating that Canadian creators
need protection when contracting with entrepreneurs. 6 6
The
contracts are typically drafted by the corporate consumers
themselves.
Not surprisingly, the latters' interests have been

65 Slawson makes this claim in respect of the U.S.: "Standard Form Contracts and the
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power" (1971) 84 Harv. L.R. 529. The position in Canada
seems no different.
66 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, supra, note 34 at 15:16 (Canadian Artists'
Representation (National)); 15:71-2 (L'Association des Photographes professionels du
Qudbec); 15:88 ff. (Canadian Association of Professional Dance Organizations); 21:32
(Alliance of Canadian Television and Radio Artists, Copyright Writers).
See too
Gouvernement du Qudbec, To Give Talent Its Due: Improving the Socio-Economic Status of
Quebec's CreativeArtists (1980) at 113 ff., 119-21. A similar position exists in EEC countries
(see Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community (1978, Sihthoff & Noordhoff) at 190
ff.) and in Australia (Catterns, "Artists' Moral Rights in Australian Law," in Australian
Copyright Council, National Symposium on Moral Rights: Report of Proceedings (1980) 28 at
48; the discussion at 50 ff. gives many practical examples of moral rights breaches in daily
Australian cultural life).
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preferred to those of the creator. 67 No corporate consumer has ever
claimed that a creator had taken unfair advantage of it in negotiating
an exploitation contract; all suits making this allegation, sometimes
successfully, have been by creators against their managers or
corporate consumers.
The future treatment of moral rights in Canada can be
predicted by looking at a typical clause in a current u.s. contract
dealing with the sale of motion picture rights in a book:
Alterations. In producing Motion Pictures hereunder, the Purchaser shall have the
right to make such changes in, additions to and eliminations from, the Novel and
to include in the Motion Pictures such language, song, music, choreography,
characters, plot, incidents and situations as it in its sole discretion may deem
advisable. The Owner shall not institute or maintain any action on the ground that
the Motion Pictures constitute 6an infringement of his "droit moral," or a reflection
on his professional reputation. 3

67 See Lewis, "Working Groups Copyright" (1982) 10 Int. Bus. Lawyer 49 at 50:
The one essential of the droit moral [in France] is that it cannot be affected by
contract. The proposal in the British green paper [supra, note 64] to adopt a kind
of watered down droit moral, but to allow authors to opt out of it by contract
totally destroys the basic conception of droit moral. It is there to protect the
authors against the all powerful users of their works - the film studios, the
television stations, the radio stations and book publishers. It is of its essence part
of an author's basic personality like his liberty and something with which he cannot
part by agreement.
Accord: A.S. Katz, "The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law: A Proposal"
(1952) Fourth ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 79 at 125-29.
On the issue of how contracts waiving moral rights are likely to be drafted, an American
practising lawyer turned professor gives this frank description of how he used to draft
contracts for a client bankTo the best of my recollection, no one in any of the corporations or in the law firm
ever suggested that the forms should be drafted other than as one-sidedly in the
interests of the corporate client as possible. Nor did anyone ever report a customer
or other business firm with which any of the corporations had dealt as objecting to
anything in any of the forms or wanting to change them. In no case in which
special arrangements were made with a very large buyer or borrower were the
favorable terms extended to other dealings of the same kind.
W.D. Slawson, "'he New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by
Standard Forms" (1984) 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21 at 44.
68 Lindey on Entertainmen; Publishing and the Arts (1985, 2d ed.), vol. 2, 802 at 806.
Similar clauses in Australian contracts are set out by Catterns, supra, note 66 at 47.
Even some law reviews cannot refrain from trying to nibble away at moral rights. The
New York University Journal of International Law & Politics contains in a so-called "Author's
Agreement" at the front of its numbers (see, eg., (1985) vol. 17, no. 4) the following provision:
1... once the Article has been assigned to the Journalstaff for citation and substance editing,
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A clause like this has been around in the u.s. motion picture industry
for decades, and the u.s. is not even a jurisdiction that recognizes
any general theory of moral rights!69 A writer who signed a contract
containing an even more formidable clause with Twentieth Century
Fox was held to have relinquished her rights to any screen credit
and control over her script. 70

This seems to be the likely fate of moral rights in Canada in
the vast majority of creative and exploitation contracts. The only
exceptions will be where the author is sufficiently successful to have
bargaining power and is adroit enough to use it, or where a powerful
guild has managed to negotiate an unalterable standard form of
contract preserving the moral rights on behalf of its members.
Against this, it may be argued that Canadian courts have
ample powers to police unfair contracts through various common law
doctrines such as unconscionability, fraud, undue influence, or
Author is committed to publishing the Article with the Journal, but may request that his/her
name(s) be deleted from the final product." This obviously seeks to short-circuit decisions
such as Joseph v. National Magazine Co. Ltd, [1959] Ch. 14.
69 See, for example, Gilliam v. A.B.C, supra, note 1; Granz v. Harris (1952), 198 F.2d
585 at 590.
70 Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (1943), 139 F.2d 571 aff'ing in part
(1942), 43 F.Supp. 119. The clause, which appears in Berman & Rosenthal, supra, note 46
at 161 (n. 17), reads:
We shall be entitled to and shall solely and exclusively own, in addition to your
services, all of the results and proceeds thereof (including, but not limited to, all
rights throughout the world of production, manufacture ...
and radio broadcasting
and of copyright, trademark and patent) whether such results and proceeds consist
of literary, dramatic, musical, motion picture, mechanical or any other form of
works, themes, ideas, compositions, creations or productions, together with the rights
generally known in the field of literary and musical endeavor as the moral rights of
authorsin andlorto any musical and/orliteraryproceeds ofyour services, includingbut
not limited to, the tights to add to, subtract from, arrange,revise, adap rearrange,
make variationsof saidproperty, and to translate the same into any and all languages,
change the sequence, change the characters and the descriptions thereofcontained h
said property, change the title of the same, use said title or any of its components in
connection with works or motion pictures wholly or partially independent of said
property, and to use all or any part of said property in new versions, adaptations,
and sequels in any and all languages, and to obtain copyright therein throughout the
world; and you do hereby assign and transfer to us all of the foregoing without
reservation, condition or limitation, and no right of any kind nature or description is
reserved by you... [Emphasis added].
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restraint of trade.7! In some cases such powers have been exercised

in England
with respect to acting, composing, and recording
72
contracts.
The problem with these doctrines, however, is that their
application is extremely uncertain73 and depends upon a "meticulous
examination of the facts" of each case.74 The doctrines also have
peculiarities that may defeat or thwart otherwise meritorious claims.
For example, under the restraint of trade doctrine, a contract is
unenforceable de futuro, not void ab initio; copyrights transferred
under it continue to be held by the assignee, unless the plaintiff can
also show that the contract should be rescinded for unconscionability,

71 1 am not competent to speak on the position under Quebec law, but I note that the
Supreme Court of Canada has considered that common law principles on restraint of trade
doctrine may be equated with those applying in Qu6bec under the provisions relating to
contracts "contraire a l'ordre public:" Cameron v. Can. Factors Corp. Ltd (1970), [19711 S.C.R.
148 at 162ff., 18 D.L.R. (3d) 574, Laskin .
72

Hepworth Mfg. Co. Ltd v. Ryott, supra, note 44; Macauly v. SchroederPublishingCo.,

[1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308 (H.I.); Clifford Davis Management Ltd v. WE.A. Records Ltd, [1975]
1 W.L.R. 61 (C.A-); O'Sullivan v. ManagementAgency & Music Ltd, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448
(C.A.); Annatradingv. Stone (1984, Q.B.D., unreported), noted in (1985) 13 Bus. L. Rev. 326.
73

Hasson, "Unconscionability in Contract Law and in the New Sales Act - Confessions
of a Doubting Thomas" in Ziegel, ed., Papers and Comments delivered at the Ninth Annual
Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law (1981), 59; cf Reiter, ibid. at 77. A recent case
rejecting unconscionability, unreasonableness and public policy arguments for invalidating a
contractual waiver, Dyck v Manitoba Snowmobile Association Inc (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 589,
18 D.L.R.(4th) 635 (S.C.C.), is the subject of extensive examination in D. Vaver,
"Developments in Contract Law. The 1984-85 Term" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 109 at 161,
where it is concluded that the Court's current treatment of unconscionability and, for that
matter, defences of unreasonableness or public policy, "holds out little prospect that the plea
is destined to occupy anything other than a marginal role in contract law." Accord: Leff,
'Thomist Unconscionability" in Ziegel, ed., at 96: "unconscionability ...
plays so slim a role in
actual adjudications."
While recommending the statutory enactment of a doctrine of unconscionability, the
Ontario Law Reform Commission in its 1987 Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract
admitted that "the doctrine has not yet been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court of
Canada, nor has it been uniformly applied by lower courts." (ibid. at 127).
74 National Westminster Bank pkc v. Morgan, [1985] 1 All E.R. 821 at 831 (H.L.).
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fraud, or undue influence. 75 Even then, these
latter pleas can be
76
delay.
as
such
defences
equitable
by
defeated
Lawsuits claiming that a contract is unfair are therefore
expensive. 77
and
time-consuming
complicated,
extremely
Corporations defending them typically have a deeper pocket than the
individual author; they also have every incentive to "show their
muscle" and fight even an unmeritorious case through to the highest
court in order not only to wear out this plaintiff but also to deter
other potential plaintiffs under contract to them from pursuing
similar actions. The fight may be waged all the more fiercely
because these doctrines, if successfully pursued, can result not merely
in a single clause, being held unenforceable but in the whole
contract and the investment under it being terminated.
The presence of the various doctrines for invalidating unfair
contracts at common law thus does little to influence behaviour in
the real world of commerce. The principles have existed for a long
time; yet clauses that would likely be held unenforceable after a
costly and harrowing trial still commonly appear in current
agreements. Corporations inserting them rely on their in terrorem
character and are aware that authors, with or without the benefit of
legal advice, are practically unable to challenge them.
Moreover, at the time many contracts are signed, the nature
and extent of a work's future exploitation may be unknown; authors
unwilling to make a fuss over a waiver of moral rights clause, when
its implications seem largely hypothetical, come to rue their decision
only later when the exploitation rights become valuable. Many
entrepreneurs know and take advantage of this fact. It should surely
be recognized that copyright is not "a game of chess in which the
public can be checkmated." 78 Nor should modern legislation allow
75 O'Sullivan v. ManagementAgency & Music Ltd, supra, note 72 at 456.
76 Elton John et aL v. Dick James Music (1985, Q.B.D.), noted in Variety, 4 December
1985, 104.
77 The Elton John trial against his manager took 50 days. See ibid. The legal costs
for the successful plaintiffs, even without any appeal, must have been enormous.
78 Morissey v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1967), 379 F.2d 675.
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the history of Modigliani to be repeated, where the
artist's family
79
Maxim's.
at
dined
dealers
his
while
poverty
lived in
f) How moral rights should be regulated.
If the Report's view that moral rights are as important to
creators as economic rights is accepted, the conclusion that they
should be freely saleable as economic rights should not follow. The
transfer of economic rights may provide the entrepreneur with the
necessary incentive to exploit the author's work for their mutual
profit. However, why moral rights should be freely waivable or
assignable in all cases has not been demonstrated.
The Government Response to the Report recognizes that
some modification of the Report's proposal is necessary "so as to
protect creators from abuse."80 The solution the Response proposes,
"to limit the term of licences and of the assignment," is, however,
inadequate to meet the abuses detailed above. How such a term
would be calculated is not stated. Presumably, section 12(5) of the
current Act, providing for the reversion of interest in copyright
grants, is not the model the Response had in mind: a term of
twenty-five years after the author's death before the interest reverts
is worthless to creators. In any event, the principal abuse to be
counteracted is the routine waiver of moral rights occurring in an
unbargained, and practically unbargainable, standard form contract.
To say that the waiver is effective for five, ten, twenty-five or
whatever period of years the legislation may stipulate is to legitimize
the abuse but to say it can only continue for an arbitrary period.
The waiver clauses set out above8 l are objectionable in principle,
whatever time limit is statutorily put on their operation.
Significantly, Bill C-60 includes no provision seeking "to limit
the term of licences ...
so as to protect creators from abuse." Unless

79 Lewis, supra, note 67.
80 Government Response, supra, note 32 at 2.
81 See accompanying text, supra, note 67; also, supra, note 69.
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these provisions are slated to appear in a later phase of the
copyright revision process, the Government has in Bill C-60 retreated
from the position set out in its Response. It has returned to the
Report's laissez-faire position. It has not even suggested that the
rights need be expressly waived; a waiver may be implied from the
circumstances, just as courts now imply a licence to use copyright.
Moreover, the Bill makes no attempt to link this power to waive
with the current reversion provisions of section 12(5) of the Act.
Thus, an author's estate to which copyright has reverted after the
twenty-five year post mortem period mandated by section 12(5) may,
for some not readily apparent reason, be unable to assert any of the
moral rights that the author waived for the entire term of the
copyright.
The dilution of moral rights goes even further than the
Report recommended. The right of paternity, including the right to
be associated with the work under a pseudonym, is, by section
12.1(1), assertible only "where reasonable in the circumstances."
Presumably, this provision was intended to appease interests such as
broadcasters, who might find it inconvenient to mention expressly the
various authors of a broadcast work unless the work itself
incorporated the authors' names, such as a film containing the
credits at its beginning or end.82 But the Bill provision goes further.
It may not be "reasonable in the circumstances" for a ghost-writer to
have any right of credit that can be sold through relinquishment by
waiver; nor for an employee or a team of employees to be named
as the author or authors of a work created in the course of
employment; nor for a writer to remain pseudonymous if the
publisher decides that it would now be more advantageous to issue
a work in the writer's real name; nor, contrariwise, for a writer's
name to continue in relation to a work where the publisher decides
it would be more advantageous for the work to be issued under a
pseudonym. To make the existence of a right depend on the, at
best, amorphous and, at worst, circular concept of whether or not it
is reasonable for the right to exist is, in the field of copyright,
extraordinary.

82 Charter of Rights for Creators,supra, note 8 at 62 (Recommendation 81).
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A number of solutions are possible to remedy the deficiencies
revealed by the Report and the Bill:
(1) Consistently with the philosophy that moral rights should
not be treated as commodities, waivers could be banned completely.
Authors would then have a complete veto over the way in which
their works were publicly perceived.
Absolutely prohibiting waivers would, however, not be
costless. The market price of works would marginally fall, since a
work the adaptation of which is subject to an author's absolute veto
is obviously worth less to an exploiter than one which is freely
adaptable without the possibility of third party intervention. There
would also be social costs: the derivative work might not become
available to a wider audience; "black markets," using other means of
reward to counteract authors' vetoes, might arise to avoid or blunt
the impact of the prohibition.
(2) Waivers could be permitted, with the monitoring of
undesirable encroachments on such rights entrusted to a body
representing predominantly author interests. This could, perhaps, be
modelled on the Public Lending Right Commission, which operates
under the aegis of the Canada Council and is also funded by the
Department of Communications. This would recognize the public
interest in moral rights and the author's relative inability to vindicate
them adequately by means of the conventional legal process. The
body might give advance rulings on the acceptability of particular
waivers, lay down general guidelines, and provide legal aid to authors
wishing to challenge non-compliant waivers. The arguments against
such a solution are obvious. They flow from political premises
disfavouring government intervention in what is often seen as a
private contracting matter and the public expense attendant on such
intrusion.
(3) Another possibility, drawing and expanding on the
Government Response in respect of moral "synchronization" rights,83
is to tolerate waivers in favour of author collectives where the
Government Response, supra, note 32.
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collective is shown to have established an adequate mechanism to
monitor moral rights on the assignor's behalf in accordance with his
or her wishes. This, however, would be only a partial solution: it
would leave untouched the areas where private, rather than
collective, contracting is the norm.
(4) The terms of standard forms of exploitation contracts
might be prescribed by legislation, as occurs in some countries and
as Qu6bec once proposed.8 4 Whether such legislation could be
constitutionally enacted by the federal government is debatable; and
if provincial co-operation were required, the difficulties involved in
persuading the provinces of the magnitude of the problem and
getting substantial agreement on the solution seem practically
insurmountable. Legislation along these lines in other jurisdictions
has not been a total success story. Moreover, the rapidity of
technological change, coupled with the slowness of legislative
response, suggests that this solution may prove too inflexible and
cumbersome.
(5) Perhaps the most modest - and feasible - proposal is to

permit the waiver of moral rights in some cases, for example, where
a work is transposed to another medium such as a novel into a film.
Such a model, using the current judicial process and building on
established copyright principles, may provide a solution free of the
objections that might be marshalled against the other proposals
suggested. For example, the current Copyright Act recognizes that
a work put on a sound record pursuant to a compulsory licence may
be subjected to "such alterations or omissions [as] are reasonably
necessary for the adaptation of the work" to the record.85 A quali-

84 See Gouvernement du Qu6bec, supra, note 66 at 119-21; Dietz, supra, note 66.
85 Section 19(2); see W.J. Braithwaite, "From Revolution to Constitution: Copyright,
Compulsory Licences and the Parodied Song" (1984) 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 35. A similar but

more elaborate provision exists in the U.S. Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. s. 115(a)(2); see
M. Berg, "Moral Rights and the Compulsory License for Phonorecords" (1979) 46 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 67. Section 7 of Bill C-60 would altogether repeal the present s. 19 providing for

compulsory licences for sound recordings: see generally, Plante, 'The Compulsory Mechanical
Reproduction Licence in Canada", (1987) 3 I.P.J. 161.
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fled power to waive moral rights along these lines (without the
compulsory licence feature) seems justifiable in a new Act.
This proposal differs from the model in Bill C-60 in respect
of paternity rights, where the very existence of the right depends
upon a prior question of reasonableness. Under my proposal, the
existence of the right to waive would be conceded. Only the exercise
of such a right would be regulated by the touchstone of
reasonableness. My proposal would not give absolute rights to either
party, that is, to the author an absolute right of veto or to the
exploiter an absolute right to disregard the author entirely. Instead,
a sort of "fair dealing" balance of rights would be established: the
exploiter could modify or credit the work in a way that was
necessary for its exploitation, but the changes would be judged
objectively according to the exigencies of the particular enterprise
and the type of exploitation. This recognizes the flexibility needed
to exploit copyright work, while at the same time wonderfully
concentrating the minds of the exploiters on the need to consider
the continuing interests and wishes of the originator with some
respect. It would help protect the author in a frequent class of
moral rights disputes where the management or policies of the
entrepreneur corporation have changed, since the formation of the
contract, and informal assurances that the author has received and
relied on concerning the way in which the work would be exploited
are peremptorily disregarded.! 6 In negotiations, it would create

The Whitford Committee, supra, note 20, similarly recommended that "'reasonable'
modifications" of a work should be allowed and that moral rights "can in appropriate cases be
waived": para. 56. It supported the similar philosophy underlying the revised Netherlands
Copyright Law, Art. 25: para. 55. The most recent U.K. White Paper has stepped back from
a theory of limited waiver it would allow authors to waive moral rights, omitting any
qualification about "in appropriate cases"; in any event, authors, while having a right to claim
authorship and to object to distortion, will be unable to object to "modification of a work to
which they could not reasonably refuse consent": Department of Trade and Industry,
Intellectual Property and Innovation (Cmnd. 9712, 1986) 73. See generally, Dworkin, "Moral
Rights in English Law - The Shape of Rights to Come" [1986] 8 E.I.P.R. 329 at 330, 332-33.
86 Thus, the studio's change of mind concerning the ending of the film "Brazi" (see

supra, note 2) seems to have been prompted by a change of management with different views
about what sort of film would "sell" to the public. See also Frisby v. B.B.C. (supra, note 27

at 111-12), where assurances, not amounting to collateral promises, made by the defendant's
manager to the author about the integrity of the script - in particular, some lines containing
sexual innuendo - were later disregarded by the former's more puritanical successor.
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incentives for entrepreneurs to treat the author differently from a
producer of pork bellies, who has no further interest in his product
other than the money to be realized from immediate sale. It would
simultaneously assist in protecting exploiters against super-sensitive
authors who make unreasonable claims or in adopting unreasonable
negotiating stances.
It is important to recognize that many authors sufficiently
aggrieved by a perceived assault on their moral rights have gone and
will, despite all odds, continue to go to law to vindicate their
position. A wide range of possible causes of action, apart from any
provided by the Copyright Act is available to creative counsel
representing them.8 7 A sensible remedy provided by the Copyright
Act would tend to channel these disputes away from inappropriate
causes of action based on invalidating "unfair" contracts and on torts
such as defamation, passing off or injurious falsehood. All these
causes have their own idiosyncrasies and represent costly overreactions to the real grievance between the parties. If a dispute
arose under the regime I have suggested, the issue would be
refocused from the wide-ranging inquiries mandated by such
common-law actions to some more pertinent question like: having
regard to the purpose of the exploitation, is the modifier's work
compatible with the initial creator's rights or paternity of integrity?
The parties' relationship and their investment will more likely be
preserved upon the resolution of the dispute, instead of running the
risk of being entirely destroyed if a costly common-law action is
waged.
Admittedly, in dealing with the suggested issue a court might
be required to exercise some aesthetic or literary judgment, a task
for which judges are not particularly equipped by training,
predilection or experience. However, a court could have expert
evidence on the issue presented to it which it could weigh judicially,
just as it already does in deciding whether changes to a work "would

87

Vaver, supra, note 36 at 331-40, 368-69.
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be prejudicial to [an author's] honour or reputation."88 The risk of

aberrant decision here does not seem any greater than in any other
sort of case involving judicial supervision of transactions.

IlI. CONCLUSION
Among the five grand objectives that A Charterof Rights for
Creators set out to attain were the following:
1. Give more emphasis and reward to creative activity,
2. Clarify and extend moral rights;
5. Recognize the major importance of cultural enterprises.8 9

The Subcommittee thus saw its proposal on moral fights as one of
its most important goals.
Similarly, the Ministers' letter
accompanying the Government Response to the Report claimed that
copyright legislation
must reflect the legal recognition of the exclusive right of a creator to determine
the use of a work.... Canadians' self-expression and future cultural development are
largely dependent on the vitality of our publishing, film, recording and broadcasting
industries bu above al4 on Canadian creators for whom we must provide
encouragement andprotection9 0

The Subcommittee's recommendations have not lived up to

its aims. Moral rights have been clarified only to a point; their
theoretical expansion has been nullified by allowing waiver and
assignment. If the Report's proposal as implemented by Bill C-60
becomes law, moral rights will in practice virtually disappear from

88 CopyrightAct, s. 12(7) (see supra, note 10); see also, Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd,
supra, note 26; Crocker v. Papunya Tula Artists Pty Ltd, supra, note 36 (omission of short
introduction to art catalogue not a "material alteration" of editor's work). French courts too
apply an aesthetic test when considering whether adaptations retain the original work's
essential spirit, character and substance: Da Silva, supra, note 16 at 35.
89 Supra, note 8 at 4.
90 Ministers' letter dated February 7 1986 accompanying the Government Response,
supra, note 32 at 2 (emphasis added).
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the landscape. The Government Response to the Report, avowedly
for the purpose of protecting creators from abuse, has not
fundamentally changed this position: it has simply ensured that
moral rights will disappear for some unspecified arbitrary period of
time.
Unless the provisions of Bill C-60 are changed along the
lines suggested, the result will be to frustrate two of the Report's
other stated goals: to reward creative activity and to recognize the
major importance of cultural enterprises. Cultural enterprises
ultimately depend upon creative individuals. To diminish the
individual's control over his or her creative activity is ultimately to
remove the foundation upon which any cultural edifice is based.
91
The Government Response said as much in explicit terms.
Regrettably, these sentiments were forgotten when the Response
and Bill C-60 came to deal with moral rights.

91 See text accompanying previous footnote.

